update 2026-10-30 07:45:21

luci-theme-footstrap/root/etc/config/footstrap

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+
+config footstrap 'settings'

luci-theme-footstrap/root/etc/uci-defaults/30_luci-theme-footstrap

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+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Registration plus the symlinks that expose the admin's uploads. Nothing migrates an older footstrap
+# (OpenWrt expects a sysupgrade) except the stale pattern symlink removed below.
+
+changed=0
+
+set_opt() {
+	uci -q get "luci.$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 && return
+	uci set "luci.$1=$2"
+	changed=1
+}
+
+set_opt themes.Footstrap /luci-static/footstrap
+
+# set_opt never overwrites, and luci-base ships main.mediaurlbase, so on a stock router this line
+# sets nothing on install or upgrade: the admin picks Footstrap in Language and Style. An upgrade
+# must never move a router off its theme; on an upgrade the themes entry exists, so `changed` is 0
+# (apk exports no PKG_UPGRADE).
+if [ "${PKG_UPGRADE:-}" != 1 ] && [ "$changed" = 1 ]; then
+	set_opt main.mediaurlbase /luci-static/footstrap
+fi
+
+[ "$changed" = 1 ] && uci commit luci
+
+# uhttpd serves /www only, so uploads live in /etc (kept by lib/upgrade/keep.d) behind symlinks.
+# The pattern is NOT symlinked: an SVG opened through a same-origin URL runs as a script with the
+# admin's session (OpenWrt forum 251930). cgi-bin/luci-theme-footstrap-pattern serves it under CSP
+# 'none' + sandbox + nosniff, which uhttpd cannot attach to a static file.
+# The login background stays a symlink: its extension-less name makes uhttpd answer
+# application/octet-stream, so a direct open downloads instead of rendering. The canvas re-encode in
+# fs-assets.js is compression, not a boundary.
+mkdir -p /etc/footstrap
+if [ -d /www/luci-static/footstrap ]; then
+	ln -sf /etc/footstrap/login-bg /www/luci-static/footstrap/bg
+	ln -sfn /etc/footstrap/fonts /www/luci-static/footstrap/fonts
+fi
+# Remove a pre-0.14.11 install's stale pattern symlink (a reported security hole); `-L` only, never a
+# real file.
+[ -L /www/luci-static/footstrap/pattern.svg ] && rm -f /www/luci-static/footstrap/pattern.svg
+
+exit 0

luci-theme-footstrap/root/lib/upgrade/keep.d/luci-theme-footstrap

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Keep the admin's uploads across sysupgrade: login background, pattern, webfonts. They are written
+# at runtime, so only a firmware sysupgrade needs them listed. Not conffiles: they live outside
+# root/etc/config, and a conffiles entry the package does not ship is rejected.
+/etc/footstrap/login-bg
+/etc/footstrap/pattern.svg
+# Whole directory: the faces without the generated fonts.css leave settings.fonts 404ing every page.
+/etc/footstrap/fonts

luci-theme-footstrap/root/usr/share/luci/menu.d/luci-theme-footstrap.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+	"admin/system/footstrap": {
+		"title": "Footstrap",
+		"order": 3,
+		"action": {
+			"type": "view",
+			"path": "footstrap/appearance"
+		},
+		"depends": {
+			"acl": [ "luci-theme-footstrap" ]
+		}
+	}
+}

luci-theme-footstrap/root/usr/share/rpcd/acl.d/luci-theme-footstrap.json

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+	"luci-theme-footstrap": {
+		"description": "Footstrap theme settings saved to the router, the login background and pattern uploads, and the Footstrap settings page",
+		"read": {
+			"uci": [
+				"footstrap"
+			]
+		},
+		"write": {
+			"ubus": {
+				"uci": [
+					"set",
+					"commit"
+				],
+				"file": [
+					"remove"
+				]
+			},
+			"uci": [
+				"footstrap"
+			],
+			"cgi-io": [
+				"upload"
+			],
+			"file": {
+				"/etc/footstrap/login-bg": [
+					"write",
+					"remove"
+				],
+				"/etc/footstrap/pattern.svg": [
+					"write",
+					"remove"
+				]
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}

luci-theme-footstrap/root/www/cgi-bin/luci-theme-footstrap-pattern

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Serves the uploaded wallpaper pattern with headers a browser will not execute: opened directly as
+# a /www symlink it was a same-origin document with an authenticated LuCI session in reach (OpenWrt
+# forum 251930: a marker SVG read document.cookie, pre-login too). The theme's own use paints it via
+# mask-image or background-image, which never run script, so only the direct URL is closed here.
+#
+# Unauthenticated on purpose: the pattern paints before login (head.ut pre-paint). Safe only because
+# the script takes no input: FILE is a constant, never $QUERY_STRING or $PATH_INFO.
+
+FILE=/etc/footstrap/pattern.svg
+
+if [ ! -r "$FILE" ]; then
+	printf 'Status: 404 Not Found\r\n'
+	printf 'Content-Type: text/plain\r\n'
+	printf '\r\n'
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+printf 'Status: 200 OK\r\n'
+printf 'Content-Type: image/svg+xml\r\n'
+# Cacheable forever: fs-axes.js appends `?v=<token>`, which changes with every upload. A static
+# /www file had an ETag; this handler must not make the tile re-fetch on every page load, off flash
+# with no gzip.
+printf 'Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable\r\n'
+printf 'X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\r\n'
+printf "Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox\r\n"
+printf '\r\n'
+cat "$FILE"
+
+exit 0