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small-packages/luci-theme-footstrap/luci-upstream.pin
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2026-10-22 10:57:37 +08:00

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# Single source of the openwrt/luci commit whose two build tools we download and run as gates, and
# of their checksums. Sourced as shell (`. luci-upstream.pin`) by update-po.sh and CI.
# - jsmin.c compiled; its regex-vs-division lookback can silently eat a shipped JS file
# - i18n-scan.pl run by perl; decides whether the translation catalogue is complete
# Off a moving `master` the gate would be whatever upstream pushed last.
# To bump: change LUCI_PIN, re-fetch both files at the new commit, update their sha256s.
LUCI_PIN=5cf20c5741dc34eea0faaf7324ef3751b05fa1f3
JSMIN_SHA256=0568b14873f27f339cf66a9c43603d0bc8ca501ff62522ea924c6e8daf1be215
I18N_SCAN_SHA256=a1823d1fdd942f31a105e1e53b401e146bc10527f231e016930b1a5123ef21d3
# No ucode pin, deliberately: the `verify` job runs the router's own interpreter over the installed
# templates on both release lines (docs/ci.md), so nothing is pinned, built or stubbed here.
# usign, OpenWrt's ed25519 signer: owfeed signs each release package with it, and build-apk.sh
# builds this copy (via tools/build-usign.sh, not run in CI) to check the SDK it downloads. This is
# the commit the router's own /usr/bin/usign is built from (`usign-2025.10.03~c4c72b1b`), so signer
# and field verifier are the same code; `cc *.c` over six sources plus base64.c is the whole build.
USIGN_PIN=c4c72b1b07945ee192361dc751291a7c98d6adcd
# OpenWrt's usign RELEASE keys and the keyring commit they come from; build-apk.sh checks the SDK
# with them. The SDK is the only input that ends up inside the installed package, and the
# `sha256sums` beside the tarball is no verification: same host, same directory, unsigned
# (docs/conventions.md). `sha256sums.sig` is, verified with a key pinned from a different host
# (github.com/openwrt/keyring): the router's usign says "signature OK", and one flipped byte gives
# "verification failed". 24.10 and 25.12 do not share a key (a release key vs the unattended-build
# key). The key id is the keyring file name and the keynum usign embeds in the signature; on
# "verification failed" read that keynum first, since a key rotation looks exactly like an attack.
# The sha256 holds the content.
OPENWRT_KEYRING_PIN=fbae29d730f81c892f52e0ff00fe867444aeeae6
OPENWRT_SDK_KEY_2512=b5043e70f9a75cde
OPENWRT_SDK_KEY_2512_SHA256=d7ac10f9ed1b38033855f3d27c9327d558444fca804c685b17d9dcfb0648228f
OPENWRT_SDK_KEY_2410=d310c6f2833e97f7
OPENWRT_SDK_KEY_2410_SHA256=e3624aa9be785362a172595b4919b233268871c4365a9b8da2b42ac41745ad95