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100 lines
3.7 KiB
Ucode
Executable File
100 lines
3.7 KiB
Ucode
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/ucode
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2025 ImmortalWrt.org
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*/
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'use strict';
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import { writefile } from 'fs';
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import { cursor } from 'uci';
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import { isEmpty, RUN_DIR, validation } from './homeproxy-pro.uc';
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const cfgname = 'homeproxy-pro';
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const uci = cursor();
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uci.load(cfgname);
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const routing_mode = uci.get(cfgname, 'config', 'routing_mode') || 'bypass_mainland_china',
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proxy_mode = uci.get(cfgname, 'config', 'proxy_mode') || 'redirect_tproxy';
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let outbound_node, tun_name;
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if (match(proxy_mode, /tun/)) {
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if (routing_mode === 'custom')
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outbound_node = uci.get(cfgname, 'routing', 'default_outbound') || 'nil';
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else
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outbound_node = uci.get(cfgname, 'config', 'main_node') || 'nil';
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/* Validate the interface name before it is interpolated into an nft
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* ruleset that fw4 loads as root. It is a UCI value, and this file's own
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* threat model treats UCI as untrusted - the port and network fields a few
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* lines below are validated for exactly that reason, while tun_name was
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* not. `;` and `}` need no newline, so a value like
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* "singtun0 } ; chain evil { ..." would balance the template's trailing
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* brace and add a chain of the attacker's choosing.
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*
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* Linux interface names are at most 15 characters and cannot contain
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* whitespace or shell/nft metacharacters; anything outside that is not a
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* name we could have created, so the tun rules are simply not emitted. */
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if (outbound_node !== 'nil') {
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const candidate = uci.get(cfgname, 'infra', 'tun_name') || 'singtun0';
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if (match(candidate, /^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,15}$/) && candidate !== '.' && candidate !== '..')
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tun_name = candidate;
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else
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print(sprintf('WARN: ignoring invalid tun_name "%s" (not a valid interface name).', candidate));
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}
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}
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const server_enabled = uci.get(cfgname, 'server', 'enabled');
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let forward = [],
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input = [];
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if (tun_name) {
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push(forward, `oifname ${tun_name} counter accept comment "!${cfgname}: accept tun forward"`);
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push(input ,`iifname ${tun_name} counter accept comment "!${cfgname}: accept tun input"`);
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}
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if (server_enabled === '1') {
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uci.foreach(cfgname, 'server', (s) => {
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if (s.enabled !== '1' || s.firewall !== '1')
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return;
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/* The section name is interpolated into the nft comment below, in a
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* file fw4 loads as root. libuci only accepts [A-Za-z0-9_] in a
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* section name (a `"`, `}`, `;`, space, `.` or `-` is "invalid
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* character in name field" / "Invalid argument" on both the parser
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* and the `uci set` path), so today no name that could close the
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* comment can reach this loop through UCI at all - this mirrors the
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* tun_name guard above rather than trusting a writer's in-memory
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* cursor or a future libuci. The alphabet is exactly libuci's and
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* there is deliberately no length cap (libuci has none, and a cap
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* would skip a legal name and silently drop that server's rule).
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* The check runs first so the two warnings below only ever echo a
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* name that already passed it. */
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if (!match(s['.name'], /^[A-Za-z0-9_]+$/)) {
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print(`WARN: skipping server ${s['.name']}: invalid section name.`);
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return;
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}
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if (!validation('port', s.port)) {
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print(`WARN: skipping server ${s['.name']}: invalid port "${s.port}".`);
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return;
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}
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let proto = s.network || '{ tcp, udp }';
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if (!(proto in ['tcp', 'udp', '{ tcp, udp }'])) {
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print(`WARN: skipping server ${s['.name']}: invalid network "${proto}".`);
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return;
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}
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push(input, `meta l4proto ${proto} th dport ${s.port} counter accept comment "!${cfgname}: accept server ${s['.name']}"`);
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});
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}
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if (!isEmpty(forward))
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writefile(RUN_DIR + '/fw4_forward.nft', join('\n', forward) + '\n');
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if (!isEmpty(input))
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writefile(RUN_DIR + '/fw4_input.nft', join('\n', input) + '\n');
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